We explore a defender's prewar allocation of military resources between denial and punishment strategies for deterrence. While denial disproportionately raises the probability to countervail aggression by disrupting military forces ("guns"), punishment proportionately raises costs on the aggressor by damaging civilian values ("butter"). Because these countervailing and deterrence e¤ects are so divergent, the deployment that minimizes the risk of war can vary, depending on the defender's military capacity relative to the aggressor's. Namely, inferior parties resort only to punishment (e.g., post-Cold War North Korea), competitive parties concentrate solely on denial (e.g., Germany, Italy, and Japan), and superior parties develop both denial and punishment capabilities (e.g., Permanent Five). JEL: D30, D74, F51, F52.
Deterrence involves problems of choice among weapons, vehicles, and targets.
Bernard Brodie (1959: viii) I s n troduction Among a variety of tradeo¤s associated with its own security, a sovereign state faces two kinds of tradeo¤s concerning "guns" and "butter." 1 y ne is of how to allocate productive resources between national security and economic prosperity. Especially in the context of arms races, this production tradeo¤ has long been studied by theorists in Economics 2005Y Snyder 1971 .
The other is of how to distribute military budget between the capabilities of disrupting military forces ("guns") and of damaging civilian values ("butter"). A successful foreign policy may need to address the balance between these two capabilities (Kissinger 1957), but this destruction tradeo¤ has been largely overlooked by formal theorists. The rarity of studies on this issue contrasts sharply with the maturing literature on the production tradeo¤ as shown above. This article thus explores the problem as to the allocation military resources between denial and punishment capabilities. 2 The military strategy that intends to disrupt enemy forces is called denial (Snyder 1961) . By a¤ecting the balance of military strength against an opponent, denial aims to produce strategic advantage in war (with the countervailing e¤ect). To promote its denial capabilities, a state mainly develops conventional forces such as army tanks, navy destroyers, and air …ghters. y n the other hand, the military strategy that targets civilian values is known as punishment (Schelling 1966 costs on the opponent, punishment aims to inuence enemy behavior through its psychological impacts (with the deterrence e¤ect). 3 Not necessarily constrained to conventional forces, punishment may resort even to the use of unconventional forces such as chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (Brodie 1946 Kahn 1960 . In illuminating the destruction tradeo¤, we also address how a defender adopts and combines these two strategies to deter a potential aggressor.
For this end, we develop a game-theoretic model, where Defender allocates her military resources between denial and punishment, and Aggressor then decides whether or not to …ght Defender. Aggressor is deterred if his expected payo¤ from …ghting is short of the payo¤ from the status for which the probability of winning the war is decreased by denial, while the cost of …ghting is increased by punishment. By deriving the game's equilibrium, we seek the deployment of denial and punishment capabilities that minimizes the risk of war. There exist plenty of empirical studies on military strategies (Arreguin-Toft 2011 Bennett and Stam 1996 Stam , 1998 Snyder (1961) and Intriligator and Brito (1984) . However, unlike Snyder (1961) , whose numerical model presumes binary choice of between denial and punishment strategies, our analytical model allows continuity in allocating resources for these strategies. Also unlike Intriligator and Brito (1984), whose model of nuclear arms races regards weapons as versatile to strike either couterforce or countervalue targets in war, ours treats forces as strategy-speci…c and is concerned about the 4 To the best of our knowledge, ours is the …rst theoretical study on the prewar allocation of military resources between denial and punishment for deterrence with an analytical model.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model, which will be analyzed and solved in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. To explore the prewar allocation of military resources between denial and punishment, we develop a game-theoretic model, which depicts the interplay between Defender and Aggressor. While denial raises the likelihood of winning a war upon its outbreak, punishment in7icts the cost of …ghting on an opponent. S n the other hand, Defender 's sole purpose for military deployment is the preservation of peace, so that her payo¤ is set to be one from the status R uo and zero from …ghting. 5 For the use of the model, we assign the feminine pronoun ("she") to Defender and the masculine pronoun ("he") to Aggressor. 6 If 's capabilities D; P are endogenized, he would spend all his resources for denial, because he is interested in waging and winning war, and as speci…ed later, punishment has no impact on the probability of winning it.
The game's extensive form appears in Figure 1 .
As the war evolves with clashes of forces on battle…elds, its outcomes is determined by the relative size of denial capabilities between the belligerents. 7 The probabilities of 's winning and losing the war are thus assumed as:
where A is Lanchester's (1916) power, which determines the relative advantage to the stronger side. It is naturally assumed that A > 1 on the ground that substantially weaker parties (e.g., Irar) can have very little chances to defeat their overpowering adversaries (e.g., the U.S.) by conventional forces, or that the stronger side is given disproportionate advantage in waging war. Put formally, it is ensured by A > 1 that d Pr(win) dD is positive but negligible when D is near zero:
(2) which approaches zero with a decreasing D.
Aggressor's expected payo¤ from …ghting is set to be:
where W > 0 is 's payo¤ from winning, L > 0 his payo¤ from losing, and c > 0 the cost of …ghting per unit of punishment (P ). These payo¤s imply that the cost of …ghting increases proportionately to punishment. This setting could be justi…ed on the ground that even very weak parties (e.g., individual terrorists) can intict substantial damages on their opponent's values (e.g., unarmed civilians in the U.S.). The di¤erence in e¤ectiveness between denial and punishment, as shown above, can inuence Defender's allocation of military resources. Given Aggressor 's seuentially rational decision, Defender aims to maximize her ex ante payo¤, or euivalently to minimize the risk of war:
where Pr (SQj (D; P )) (and Pr (F j (D; P ))) are the probabilities of the status uo (and of …ghting) conditional on (D; P ), respectively. 8
By adopting subgame perfect Nash euilibrium as the game's solution, we will derive the euilibrium by backward induction. We …rst determine Aggressor 's rational decision. Because decides to …ght if his payo¤ from …ghting exceeds his payo¤ from the status uo ( > S ) and not to …ght otherwise, the probabilities of …ght and of the status uo are shown as:
Both denial and punishment can reduce the risk of war through generating the disincentive on from …ghting i.e., they both make the status uo more likely to be maintained:
While punishment directly inuence Aggressor's behavior by inicting the cost (c) on him upon the deterrence failure, denial indirectly deter the aggression through contervailing aggression ( d Pr(win) dD ). The two e¤ects of denial and punishment are summrized in Table 1 . 
If c is so large that there exists no Q i , (D ; P ) = 0; Q . §
r¨¨´µ The proof appears in Appendix. The most deterrent military deployment (D ; P ) and its thresholds (Q i ; Q ii ) are graphically illustrated in Figure 2 . 9 In (a), the relationships between the probability of the status ¶ uo (Pr (SQ (D; P ))) and each of denial (with the solid line), punishment (with the dotted line) and the most deterrent deployment (with the bold line) are shown. In (b), the marginal and average e¤ects of denial and the (constant) e¤ect of punishment are shown. 10 Proposition 1 implies that the most deterrent deployment hinges on the size of Defender's military capacity Q: (i) for small Q¸(0; Q i ), because denial has little chances to defeat Aggressor, deterrence resorts only to punishment¹ (ii) for medium Q¸(Q i ; Q ii ), denial can produce substantial chances to defeat Aggressor, so that deterrence is most likely to succeed solely by denial¹ (iii) for large Q¸(Q ii ; º ), denial's marginal contribution to deterrence falls below punishment's¹ 11 thus deterrence is most e¤ective with the denial level of Q ii and remaining Q » Q ii spent for punishment. Put formally, the following relationships hold:
Proposition 1 might be understood with its analogy to the economic theory of production. Defender has two inputs to produce "security." While denial has a changing marginal product that once rises and then falls, punishment has a constant marginal product. Because the marginal product of denial is in…nitesimal at small input levels (constituting a …xed cost), denial is adopted only when Defender has su½ cient resources (Q > Q i ) that both the marginal and average products of denial surpass those of punishment. Moreover, because the marginal product of denial falls below that of punishment with su½ ciently large levels of investment (Q > Q ii ), any additional resources above this threshold are spent for punishment. Therefore, denial is adopted only in the intermediate range of Q¸(Q i ; Q ii ). 
As we apply the results to the contemporary world politics, (i) those with a small Q Ý (0; Q i ) correspond to parties signi…cantly inferior to their rivals. Because they lack military resources to directly counter their rivals, they avoid confrontation of armed forces on battle…elds and instead develop punitive measures to deter their opponents from aggression. An exemplary state might be North Korea, which has focused its very scarce resources on nuclear programs to deter the U.S. military interventionsÞ while leaving its conventional forces more and more obsoleteÞ since it lost the Soviet military supports at the end of the Cold War. Terrorist organizations that challenge interventions by liberal democracies may also fall into this category. A caveat is that our model depicts only a dyadic situation and has limitations in its application to multi-lateral world orders. To analyze interplay across three or more parties, it might be essential to incorporate more players, who can choose to be allied aggressors, deterrers, protégés, or bystanders. caeçsèäå Despite the development of the literature on deterrence over the past decades, there have been very few theoretical studies on the allocation of military resources between denial and punishment to counter a potential aggressor. The scarcity of studies on the problem as to the destruction tradeo¤ between "guns" and "butter" is in sharp contrast to the accumulation of theoretical studies on the production tradeo¤ between them. We have taken the …rst step toward the formal theorization of the destruction tradeo¤ associated with the prewar armament for deterrence. In exploring the interplay between Defender and Aggressor, we found that the deployment of denial and punishment that minimizes the risk of war depends on Defender's military capacity relative to Aggressor's. Namely, if Defender is no match for Aggressor in conventional …ghts, she should invest all her resources for punishment (e.g., post-Cold War North Korea and terrorist organizations). 12 In contrast, if Defender is more or less in balance with Aggressor, she should focus on denial (e.g., Germany, Italy, and Japan). à nly if Defender has considerable resource advantage, she should develop both denial and punishment (e.g., Permanent Five). The risk-minimizing deployment can vary, because denial's marginal e¤ect on deterrence appears inverted U-shaped, while punishment's marginal e¤ect more stable (Figure  2-b) . These results are largely consistent with the contemporary global security environments (Table 2) . à ur theory suggests that denial and punishment have distinct rationales. According to Snyder (1961) , one of the drawbacks of punishment lies in its diê culty in producing credible commitment to retaliation upon deterrence failure. à n a very di¤erent ground, our theory upholds denial rather than punishment in competitive security environments, not because punitive strikes on civilians are so devastating (Brodie 1946), but because denial could outperform punishment in a¤ecting Aggressor's decision calculus to wage war by signi…cantly undermining his prospect of successful aggression. ë n the other hand, if there exists signi…cant imbalance in military capacity between Defender and Aggressor, punishment might be worth preparing, in part because even very limited spending for punishment (by inferior Defender) can generate tremendous psychological impacts, but also because aì uent spending for denial (by superior Defender) may su¤er its diminishing marginal returnsí predominant Defender is very likely to defeat Aggressor regardless of additional denial capabilities. This reasoning is also novel to the existent proposition that the invulnerability of unconventional forces favors punishment (Coldfelter 1989î Pape 1996 .
To recap our work's innovation, we took the …rst step toward the theoretical research on the resource allocation for military strategies. Further fruitful ï uestions might be garnered by delving into other military strategies (such as attrition, fait accompli, guerrilla, and maneuver), by modeling strategies in more detailed manners (such as combination, dynamics, determinants, and e¤ects), or by incorporating relevant factors (such as alliance, bargaining, geography, and intelligence). Military strategy will remain a promising research agenda. The proposition seeks the allocation (D ; P ) that minimizes Pr (F j (D; P )), or F ( ). Because F ( ) monotonically increases with , Pr (F j (D; P )) is minimized when is minimized. Below we consider the minimization of , which decreases with both D and P :
for which d Pr(win) dD > 0 (E(uation (2)). In addition, Pr (win) holds the following properties in its relation to D:
Those say, Pr (win) is monotonically increasing with D (E(uation (2)), convex for
1=A D (Ine(uality (9)) and concave for D > A 1 A+1 1=A D (Ine(uality (10)).
Because punishment has a constant e¤ect on (E(uation (6)) and no e¤ect on Pr (win) (E(uation (1)), the convexity of Pr (win) for D < A 1 A+1 1=A D implies that the solution is at corner (with either D = 0 or P = 0) when Q is su¢ ciently small, while the concavity of Pr (win) for D > A 1 A+1 1=A D implies that the solution is interior (with both D > 0 and P > 0) when Q is su¢ ciently large.
If c is not so large, there exist Q i and Q ii that satisfy the following properties: (i) For Q P (0; Q i ), because the marginal e¤ect of denial is so low with a small D (E(uations (5) and (7)), punishment is more e¤ective than denial (E(uation (6) If c is su2 ciently large, punishment is more e¤ective than denial4 i.e., (Q; 0) > (0; Q) regardless of Q. Thus, there exists no Q i , and (D ; P ) = 0; Q : This occurs with a su2 ciently large c, because both Pr (win) is bounded from above (E0uation (1)).
If c takes a special value, there exists only one value of Q such that Pr (F Below we extend the model by incorporating ex post payo¤s that accrue from war outcomes upon deterrence failure. With this extension, Defender takes into account the prospects of winning and losing the war upon its outbreak so as to maximize her ex ante payo¤: where W , L , and S are her ex post payo¤s from the victory, defeat, and status D uo, respectively.
Even with this extension, the results are similar. Figure 3 shows the optimal deployment with the same parameter values and function as in the baseline model (W i = 5; L i = 5; for i 
